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Abstract: In this paper I claim that, if Minimalist Premises about 
derivations are accepted, Logical Form as an interface level where 
syntactic (albeit covert) operations are performed should not be part of 
the model. I propose an analysis of Quantifier Raising and covert Wh-
movement phenomena that relies solely on features of the functional 
category Quantifier and on overt operations of Merging and Checking. 
The notions of c-command and scope are rejected as explanations for the 
ambiguities of sentences containing quantifiers. Consequently, covert 
movement of Quantifier Phrases is not only unnecessary, but logically 
untenable. 
O. Introduction. Ambiguities are a fact of language. It is often the case that the same 
string of words can have multiple meanings. The following sentences are all ambiguous. 
However, the nature of their ambiguity is considered different. Accordingly, the 
mechanisms invoked to explain their diverse interpretations varies from one to the other. 
(1 ) a. There is a bat over there 
b. She cannot bear children 
(2) a. The spy saw the cop with the binoculars 
b. Flying planes can be dangerous 
(3) The statues were buried 
(4) a. Every man loves a woman 
b. Every spy suspects some Russian 
c. I will force you to marry no one 
d. No Russian is a spy 
(5) My brother read a book yesterday 
I I am indebted to the participants at the Syntax Salon at the University of Arizona. In particular, I cannot 
be thankful enough to Eloise Jelinek for instructing me on the issues I did not know about that were 
relevant for this research. Also, Rudy Troike, Antxon Olarrea, Andrew Carnie, Andrew Barss, Terry 
Langendoen, and the other participants gave me insightful comments. I thank Tom Bever, because it was in 
response to a question by him that I come up with these arguments. 
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Most researchers agree that the ambiguities in (1) are of a lexical nature. These sentences 
contain words (bat, bear) that are ambiguous. However, the rest of the examples above 
do not include lexically ambiguous words. Their ambiguities are accounted for through 
syntactic mechanisms. Few syntacticians would disagree that the ambiguities in (2) are 
due to the fact that there are two different syntactic derivations for the same surface string 
of words. The difference lies in the phrase structure of the two derivations (with the 
binoculars can attach to police or to saw, for instance). The ambiguity in (3) is attributed 
to the contrast in syntactic category of the past participle (if it is a verb, the sentence 
refers to an action. If it is an adjective, it refers to the state the statues were in). As for 
(4), the ambiguity is explained in terms of scope between several quantifiers or between a 
quantifier and a modal verb. This ambiguity is dealt with at the level of Logical Form, 
through the operation called Quantifier Raising (QR). Finally, (5) is ambiguous regarding 
its action type: it could mean that my brother finished the entire book yesterday 
(accomplishment), or that he engaged in some book-reading for a while, without 
necessarily completing the book (activity). Lexical, structural, categorial, scopal and 
aspectual are all possible types of ambiguities that have been considered in the literature. 
In this paper I argue that the reasoning that applies to the ambiguities in (2) 
should apply equally to those in (3), (4) and (5): if a sentence has two meanings, there are 
two different syntactic (overt) derivations for it. All these ambiguities are structural in 
nature, as opposed to lexical ambiguities like those in (1). Categorial, scopal and 
aspectual are all syntactic ambiguities. I claim that, as such, they should be accounted for 
by the syntactic mechanisms proposed by Minimalism for overt syntax. In my analysis, 
the predicate buried in (3) has only one category: verb (Sanz and Bever, in press); 
reference to LF movement is unnecessary to explain the meanings of (4); and aspect is 
part of the inflectional component of sentences (Sanz, 1996). I will concentrate on the 
examples in (4), involving determiner quantifiers, because they have been traditionally 
analyzed with recourse to covert syntax (Logical Form)2. I claim that, if Minimalist 
premises about derivations are accepted, LF movement (Quantifier Raising, for instance) 
is not only logically unnecessary but impossible to maintain in order to explain the data. 
2 I will not deal with adverbial quantifiers of the type that also exists in English, such as all in the sentence 
The fish is all cooked, for instance. 
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Whether or not those Minimalist premises are the best way to characterize syntax is not 
the topic of this paper. There will undoubtedly be new ways of picturing syntactic 
operations in the future. My proposal offers a way of reasoning within the model as 
presented in Chomsky (1995), without questioning the major tenets of the theory other 
than the necessity for movement operations at LF. Although I will limit myself to cases 
of QR and Wh-movement, the same reasoning should be extended to other types of 
phenomena that ares dealt with by positing LF movement. I will not discuss (3) or (5), 
despite the fact that the analysis proposed here applies equally to them (see Sanz 1996, 
and Sanz and Bever, in press for a complete account of these ambiguities). 
I aim to eliminate LF as a level where syntactic (although covert) operations take 
place. Logical Form is precisely what its name indicates: the logical meanings a sentence 
can express, a description of its possible interpretations. Imagine that I choose to state the 
two senses of (2) as follows (using logic operators): 
(6) a. There is a cop with binoculars such that I saw him 
b. There is a cop such that I saw him with binoculars 
These are the two logical forms of this sentence. But they are not two Logical Forms in 
the technical sense used in generative grammar. This is because we have a preferred 
mechanism to account for the two meanings based on overt syntax: phrase structure 
ordering. Covert movement need not be posited to explain this ambiguity. 
LF mechanisms (QR in particular), on the other hand, are called for when the 
sentences contain quantifiers. At LF, there are covert applications of Move alpha to place 
the quantifiers in the right c-commanding position for scope. I believe that the notion of 
wide and narrow scope based on c-command relations is wrong and it is what has 
prevented researchers from strictly following the premises of the model and deriving the 
meaning of sentences from the overt computation. This attachment to the notion of c-
command to explain scope weakens attempts to eliminate Logical Form like that of 
Kayne (1998): he is forced to posit several operations of overt movement that seem 
empirically unjustified. I propose that the checking of features that occurs before Spell-
Out contains all the required semantic information and creates a unique structure with a 
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unique meaning for every derivation. The reason is that functional categories contain 
purely formal features but also semantic features that can be checked "for free" when the 
former are checked overtly. 
In sum, I assume that logical operators are and must be used only to describe the 
meanings of sentences, not to explain or cause language phenomena. All Logical Forms 
are then reduced to "logical forms" or descriptions of the meaning of the possible several 
derivations that end in the same surface form. In a nutshell, there are ambiguous 
sentences (i.e., ambiguous surface strings) but not ambiguous derivations. 
This theory has two very desirable results: it offers a unified account of syntactic 
ambiguities using only the accepted premises of the model for overt syntax, and it 
reduces the model itself so that it becomes more minimal. In my account, Spell-Out is 
the end of the syntactic derivation: after Spell-Out, the sentence is sent only to PF. The 
derivation creates a sentence with only one meaning (like each of the two derivations in 
(2)). Ambiguities are such only from the point of view of the hearer, who, like in (2), is 
aware of both possible trees and must choose by context or by a natural bias towards one 
of them in his language. 
At a more conceptual level, I will claim that ambiguity is a consequence of 
economy. Features of functional categories are the cause of syntactic operations. My 
account argues that semantic ambiguities result from features having a plus or a minus 
sign. This means that languages have a tremendously rich expressive power with a very 
limited inventory of words (the closed-class, the functional categories). 
1. Scope, c-command and features. Scope is an LF notion based on c-command 
relations. The two meanings of (4) are said to derive from the quantifier every having 
narrow or wide scope over the quantifier a (May 1985)3. 
(7) a. [s [NP every manh [s [NP a womanh [se210ves e3]]] 
(For every man, there is a woman such that he loves her) 
b. [s [NP a womanh [s [NP every manh [s e2 loves e3]]] 
(There is a particular woman such that all men love her) 
3 May's example is Every spy suspects some Russian. I have copied the derivation and changed the words, 
using every and a instead of every and some. The accounts are identical. 
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There are two instances of QR in each of these derivations. QR moves phrases to 
positions like [Spec, IP], from which they can have scope. After the two operations have 
been performed, the correct c-command configuration to account for the wide and narrow 
scope of the quantifiers with each other is achieved. Scope, according to this, depends on 
structural position. 
This analysis disregards the well-known fact that the quantifiers involved in this 
derivation are ambiguous when they occur by themselves, even in sentences with no 
other arguments. Obviously, c-command notions are not needed in explaining these 
ambiguities, since there are no other quantifiers to have scope over or to c-command. 
Observe the following example. 
(8) There is a book on the table 
Out of context, this sentence means both that there is only one book on the table or that 
there is an unspecified book (some book or other). The quantifier a in English is, 
therefore, ambiguous between a specific meaning in which it is equivalent to the number 
one (which, following Troike (1990) I will consider specific), and an interpretation in 
which it is unspecific (in which case it opposes itself to the). Now note sentence (9). In 
this case, a does not mean one woman in particular, but any woman. It is a reference to 
the individual as a type (Carlson, 1977). 
(9) A woman always knows what she wants 
There are, therefore, at least two dimensions of the quantifier a which characterize its 
meaning: +I-specificity and +I-type reading. 
Now consider the also ambiguous quantifier every in English. In some sentences, 
every can be equivalent to all or synonymous with each. However, in other cases, only 
the distribute reading (each reading) is allowed. Whereas (lO)a may have the two 
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paraphrases below, the distributive interpretation is preferred In (10)b, where many 
events of individual helping take place.4 
(10) a. I read every book in this room 
I read all the books in this room 
I read each book in this room 
b. I helped every child 
Furthermore, with type predicates, only all and not every is allowed. The quantifier every 
has a preferred distributive reading in comparison with all (Gil (1995)). 
(11) a. All men gathered at dawn 
b. *Every man gathered at dawn 
This type of ambiguity in certain quantifiers is pervasive in English. For instance, the 
quantifier somebody is ambiguous between a specific and a non-specific reading (Andrew 
Barss, p.c.). One can make the following statement, whether one has a specific person in 
mind that is on the other side of the door or whether one has heard noises that indicate the 
presence of an unspecified person. 
(12) There is somebody outside 
Milsark (1974) noted differences among determiners that permitted to classify them into 
two groups: strong and weak. Weak determiners are capable of appearing in existential 
sentences, whereas strong determiners are banned in this construction. Diesing (1992) 
explores this distinction further in terms of presuppositionality of quantifiers, which 
offers us a third dimension along which to consider the ambiguity of a. 5 
4 In fact, Haspelmath (1995) points out that there are three diachronic sources for every or its equivalents in 
Indo-European languages: (a) free-choice indefinite determiners like "any", (b) distributive prepositions 
and (c), "all". Thus, more features and interpretations are possible, but, for simplicity of the argument, I 
limit myself to the most obvious synchronic ones, expressed in my account as [+I-distributive]. 
5 See also de Hoop (1995) for a refinement of the weak/strong opposition. She claims that weak and strong 
NPs can in turn have weak and strong readings. For her, different properties of determiners can be crucial 
in different linguistic context. This is an idea akin to the one developed in this paper. 
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(13) a. There is/are alsome/a few/many/three fly (flies) in my soup. 
b. *There is/are the/every/all/most fly (flies) in my soup 
[Examples from Diesing (1992)] 
Weak determiners are ambiguous between a presuppositional and a non-presuppositional 
or cardinal reading (the latter is an assertion of the existence of the entities they refer to), 
whereas strong determiners presuppose the existence of the entities they apply to. This is 
exemplified as follows. 
(14) a. There are some ghosts in my house. 
(Unstressed ghosts, asserts the existence of ghosts) 
b. SOME ghosts are in my pantry; the others are in the attic. 
(Presupposes the existence of ghosts). 
[Examples from Diesing (1992)] 
In the case of (8) above, the non-presuppositional reading is further ambiguous between 
an interpretation in which a is equivalent to one and one in which it is merely non-
presuppositional (which I call "cardinal" following Diesing 1992). 
Thus, any sentence with a weak quantifier in its object position, for instance, is 
bound to be ambiguous, because the lexical entries of these quantifiers are ambiguous. 
Lexical entries are a collection of features. The previous observations about the meaning 
of the quantifier a in English lead us to think that its lexical entry has at least the 
following features: [+/-specific], [+/-cardinal], [+/-type]. There are four possible 
combinations of these features ([ +specific] and [+type] are incompatible features within 
the same lexical item, and hence that combination is excluded). These combinations 
account for the three meanings illustrated in (8), (9) and for the interpretation of 
examples similar to (14)b but containing the quantifier a, in which the existence of the 
entity (in this case, the book) is presupposed. 
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(15) a. [+specific], [+cardinal], [-type]: 
There is a book (only one) on the table 
b. [-specific], [+cardinal], [-type]: 
There is a book (some book or other) on the table 
c. [+specific], [-cardinal], [-type]: 
A unicorn is in my garden. 
d. [ -specific], [-cardinal], [+type]: 
A woman (any woman, "women") knows what she wants 
The peculiarities of the meaning of every can also be stated in terms of features. This 
quantifier can be [+I-distributive]. 
The data in this brief section show that quantifiers express more than one meaning 
when used in isolation. Lexical items are described in terms of features, and therefore the 
possible interpretations of the quantifiers can be captured naturally through the features 
of these words. Notions of scope or c-command are not relevant to explain these simple 
sentences. 
2. Radically Minimal. In this section, I review some familiar premises of the Minimalist 
modeL I argue that, if these premises are accepted, the type of covert movement which 
prevails in the literature on LF cannot be maintained. In other words, one cannot logically 
postulate LF as a syntactic level whose operations are necessary before the end of the 
derivation for the sentence to be interpretable. The model should consist of a derivation 
and a point of Spell-Out, after which the derivation is sent to PF. All the operations 
before Spell-Out should yield the correct semantics of the sentence. The following are 
some of the general assumptions of Minimalism. 
1. A derivation starts with a numeration (an array of elements with their features). The 
derivation consists of rearranging the elements of the numeration. 
2. Different derivations have different meanings. 
3. Syntactic operations are caused by features of functional categories (or, in other 
words, only features of functional categories cause syntactic operations). 
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4. Movement means movement of features. Only PF convergence forces anything but 
features to raise. During the derivation, some material is pied-piped to satisfy PF. 
This means that overt movement is movement of phrases or heads. Covert movement, 
on the contrary, is movement of FEATURES ALONE. 
5. At every step of the derivation, there is a comparison for economy with possible 
competitor derivations (only with those that have the same features or are consistent 
with what has taken place until that point). Once something is checked or an 
operation takes place on an element and the derivation proceeds to the next step, it 
cannot be changed later on. 
6. Features of functional categories must be checked by lexical items. Checking is 
performed by placing the lexical item in the functional projection with the features. 
Checking features (i.e., being in the right projection to check features) is the reason 
for movement of lexical items. 
7. Only functional categories with some semantic import are allowed in the structure 
(according to Chomsky, only Comp, T and Det). 
8. Features may have a plus or a minus sign. The sign of features of both functional 
categories and lexical items is specified for each derivation (for instance, at the point 
of choosing the numeration, it is determined whether the derivation will be [+past], a 
particular noun will be [+Nominative], etc.). 
9. Features are strong or weak: a strong feature requires an overt operation to check it. A 
weak feature does not hold such requirement. The strength of features is fixed within 
a language. Parameters are the consequence of the difference is strength between 
languages. (In other words, to argue that a feature is strong in a language, ideally we 
should find that it is weak in another). 
10. The operations that drive the derivation are Select, Merge, Move and Spell-Out. The 
operation of Move is recast in terms of attraction of features: a functional category 
with a formal feature attracts a lexical category with the same feature. Therefore, the 
operation Move is called Attract. When attracting features, all of them come as a 
bunch. Some features are checked "for free" when a feature needed for overt 
checking is attracted by a functional category. 
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Premise number 3 shows that the traditional LF approach to covert movement 
summarized in Section 1 cannot be maintained. That approach proposes covert movement 
of phrases (and even of entire clauses). In order to establish the right position for c-
command (on which scope depends), IP is iterated or a Spec is created. As opposed to 
this, movement of features does not create a position because it does not pied-pipe any 
phrases or heads. The features should be able to move by themselves to the functional 
category whose (weak) feature they are checking. Under this premise, we must re-think 
LF movement and the requirement that a quantifier phrase c-commands entire portions of 
the sentence. Premise number 10 makes matters worse: movement, even covert 
movement, is attraction of features. A new Spec or any other position cannot be created 
for movement of an element. The position must be there and must embed a feature that 
needs checking. Hence, movement for the purpose of achieving a c-command position is 
not justified. These two facts alone legitimate an attempt like this to question LF 
operations, to argue against QR and to find an alternative explanation for semantic 
ambiguities. 
Let us analyze the implications of the other premises of Minimalism: Determiners 
are functional categories. Determiners form DPs with lexical items, and these DPs 
become the arguments of the verb. In this sense, Determiners are a different type of 
functional category than Tense or Comp, since they project onto phrases that are inserted 
in the VP. Other functional categories form part of the inflectional component, placed 
above VP. Nonetheless, Determiners are functional, and as such, have features that 
require checking. Some of their features are strong (i.e., morphological features), which 
means that checking must be overt. How does the checking of Determiner features occur? 
By the operation of Merge, Determiners join lexical items to create DPs. The following is 
the derivation of the DP a woman. The Det a has the strong feature [+singular]. 
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Following the premises of bare phrase structure proposed in Chomsky (1995b)6, the 
"percolation" of the feature [+singular] to the maximal node does not necessitate further 
explanation: when two elements Merge, a new object is created which is the projection of 
one of the two elements (in this case, D). The label of the new object is the very same 
element that projects. Thus, it can be assumed that the D with all its features becomes the 
label of the new object. This explains that the new DP will be [+singular] for the 
remainder of the derivation. From this point of the computation on, this DP will perform 
operations that require those features (e.g., will have to check the number of TP). No 
other features can be added or changed in it for the rest of the computation. 
However, observe the ill-formed DP *a women. Ifthe features of the complement 
in a Merging operation were irrelevant, the derivation of a women would be grammatical: 
a new object in which the D becomes the label of the projection is formed. But if Spell-
Out were to apply at this point, the DP would crash at PF. 














This suggests that when a functional category Merges with its complement, the 
morphological features of both items must be checked against each other for agreement, 
or else the derivation will crash when it is Spelled Out. But the complement is not in the 
checking domain of the head. A possible solution for this checking of features is to posit 
overt adjunction of the complement to its head, as in (18), which preserves the word 

















What is clear is that the checking of the Determiner features must occur at the point of 
Merging with its complement, since there is an evaluation procedure that considers 
whether the derivation can continue or crashes after the DP is created. The adjunction 
operation proposed in (18) has no empirical consequences that I can see. It is a mere 
theoretical device to account for the checking of the morphological features of both the D 
and its complement. There is an alternative explanation that does not pose a movement 
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operation but would have to change the model to include some kind of checking in 
internal domains. I will not develop this idea further here, but it must be noted that there 
are phenomena related to Aktionsart, unaccusatives and Case marking in objects that is 
unexplained so far in the model. Sanz (in progress) develops an analysis of these facts 
based on the influence of objects in the functional component of sentences. In this 
analysis, she proposes a kind of checking in internal domains which consists of the 
complement of a head activating linguistically some features of the head at the point of 
Merging. Even though this may sound far-fetched, it is important to realize that, since 
Merging consists of joining a lexical item to a functional category in the same projection, 
it is a legitimate checking procedure by premise number 6. Thus, Merging alone creates 
the necessary conditions for checking, without further ado. I will leave the issue of 
deciding between the adjunction operation and a special type of checking in internal 
domains open, reminding the reader that either plain Merging or Merging followed by an 
overt adjunction operation of the complement to its head accounts for the morphological 
checking that takes place between the head of a DP and its complement. Both of these are 
overt operations. 
3. Semantic features of Quantifiers. The prevIous derivation of a DP was a 
simplification. The feature [+singular] is not the only feature of a, although it may be its 
only morphological one. Let us now consider a richer set of features based on our 
analysis in Section 1 of this paper. Furthermore, imagine that the DP a woman is the 
subject of a particular derivation. As before, the number feature is strong and must be 
checked by the merged complement. The Determiner and the Noun have other features, 
both semantic ([+cardinal], [+specific]), and purely formal ([+NominativeD. Since 
nothing can be changed or added later on in this DP, all these features, even if they are 
weak, percolate "for free" at the point of Merging, when strong [+singular] is obligatorily 
checked (this is assuming that the semantic features are weak. Since Merging is an overt 
operation but checking of all the features of the Determiner occurs at the same time, there 
is no way to determine whether these features are also strong, as number is). The DP is 
created successfully in this way, and for the remainder of the computation it will be 
[+singular],[+cardinal],[+specific], [+Nominative]. 
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In sum, checking of features is fulfilled when the lexical item and the functional category 
are in the same functional projection. Whereas the features of other functional categories 
(like Tense and Comp, for instance), are satisfied by movement, because they are above 
the VP, the checking of features of Determiners occurs through Merging of a lexical item 
which has the same morphological features as D. This creates a syntactic object (a DP) 
that inherits those features and becomes part of the argument structure of the sentence by 
Merging in turn into the VP (as subject, object or some other complement). All the 
features of the quantifier are checked at this point in the derivation. An evaluation 
procedure will eliminate those DPs that are badly formed based on morphological 
features, which are strong. The semantic features are checked for free because once the 
DP is formed, nothing can be added to it. This checking of features as the computation 
takes place makes unnecessary any further checking after Spell-Out. 
In the discussion above, I have been using the word Determiner. But I could have 
substituted it for Quantifier. Quantifiers are Determiners, and hence functional categories. 
As functional categories, their features are determined for every particular derivation at 
the point of the numeration. The sign of the features specified in Section 1 must be 
established in the numeration. For instance, an occurrence of every enters the numeration 
as either [+distributive] or [-distributive], and the derivation proceeds based on that. 
Returning to sentence (4)a, (every man loves a woman), the derivation in which every 
man loves the same woman is different from the derivation in which each man loves a 
different woman, because their numerations differ. 
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At some point in the derivation, the quantifier will be selected to enter the derivation. It is 
at this moment that it projects and joins another lexical item to create a QP. Its features 
are checked but not eliminated, since they have semantic import. They become part of the 
entire QP. In the case of the QP every man, a [+distributive] every forms a [+distributive] 
QP as long as it joins a morphologically singular man. For the remainder of the 
derivation, the QP will be [+distributive]. No matter what operations this QP performs 
during the derivation, its features have already been checked overtly at the point of 
Merging. No covert rearranging of its position or movement of its features is necessary to 
derive the meaning of the QP in a particular derivation. 









Considering the features of every and a that we proposed in Section 1, sentence (4)a 
should have multiple meanings, not only the two allowed by scope interactions. This is 
because one of the quantifiers involved (the weak a) has four possibilities of combination 
of its features, and the other (strong every) has two. The following table summarizes 
these possibilities. 
(21) Possible meanings of a: 
a. [+specific], [+cardinal], [-type]: There is only one book on the table 
b. [-specific], [+cardinal], [-type]: There is some book or other on the table 
c. [+specific], [-cardinal], [-type]: A unicorn is in my garden (only one) 
d. [-specific], [-cardinal], [+type]: Any woman knows what she wants ("women") 
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Possible meanings of every: 
A. [ +distributive ] 
B. [-distributive] 
The possibilities of combination of the preceding quantifiers are multiple. In other words, 
there are many potential derivations based on the elements every, man, loves, a, woman, 
each of them with different features in the numeration. In particular, depending on the 
features of the two quantifiers selected in the numeration, there are eight possible 
numerations in which every man is the subject and a woman is the object. Imagine a set 
of men composed by [A, B, C] and a set of women containing [X, Y, Z]. The possible 
numerations and their meanings are exemplified in the following chart. 
(22) 1. every = [+distributive] (each); a= [+specific], [+cardinal], [-type]: 
(one, non-presuppositional) 
Meaning: A, B and C (individually) love one and only one woman. A loves 
X, B loves Y and Cloves Z, for instance. Or both A and B love X, Cloves Y 
and nobody loves Z. (It is a trait of the individual characters of A, B and C to 
love only one woman). 
2. every = [-distributive] (all); a = [+specific], [+cardinal], [-type]: 
(one, non-presuppositional) 
Meaning: A, B and C (as a group) love only one woman (it is a trait of men 
as a group to love one and only one woman). 
3. every = [+distributive] (each); a = [-specific], [+cardinal], [-type]: 
(some or other, non-presuppositional) 
Meaning: A, B and C individually love some woman or other (X, Y or Z). 
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4. every = [-distributive] (all); a = [-specific], [+cardinal], [-type]: 
(some or other, non-presuppositional) 
Meaning: A, B and C as a group love some woman or other (it is a trait of 
men as a group to love some woman or other). 
5. every = [+distributive] (each); a = [+specific] [-cardinal], [-type]: 
(one, presuppositional) 
Meaning: A, B and C individually love only Y, for instance (all of them love 
the same woman). 
6. every = [-distributive] (all); a =, [+specific] [-cardinal], [-type]: 
(one, presuppositional) 
Meaning: A, B and C as a group love Y (it is a trait of the group to love Y). 
7. every = [+distributive] (each); a = [specific], [cardinal], [+type]: 
("women") 
Meaning: A, B and C individually love women in general (not particularly X, 
Yand Z) (loving women is a trait of their individual characters). 
8. every =[-distributive] (all); a = [-specific], [-cardinal], [+type]: 
("women") 
Meaning: A, B and C as a group love women in general (loving women is a 
trait of men as a group). 
Of course, the chart is, in principle, alarming. The same sentence cannot have eight (or 
more) different meanings. Language would be extremely inefficient if this were true. But 
there is no cause for such alarm. In fact, I will argue that language is efficient precisely 
because of this situation. After all, ambiguities are such only from the point of view of 
the hearer, who must decode the sentence. Derivations are not ambiguous per se. 
Languages come with enough devices to make the hearer's task easier. To begin with, 
words have preferred readings, based probably on the frequency of use of the item with 
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certain features. For instance, the word every is preferred in the distributive reading, since 
the language has alternatives to express collectivity: all men, for instance (Gil (1995) 
proves this to be the case cross-linguistically). If the speaker meant that men as a group 
love, say, the same woman, he would have had the choice of disambiguating by using a 
different quantifier. Likewise, in the unlikely event that all men loved only one and the 
same woman, the derivation could have contained the unambiguous quantifier one. 
Furthermore, some of these meanings collapse with each other because the end result is 
the same whether they are used in the distributive or type meaning. In our example, the 
use of the word every as "each" or "all" does not really make a difference as to the 
elements of the set that should be included (which are A, B and C). This is because the 
position where it is in our example is a topic position which must be presuppositional 
(according to Diesing (1992)'s Mapping Hypothesis). In Minimalist terms, this means 
that the functional projection where subjects are (whether it is TP, TopicP, EventP, etc.) 
has a feature [-cardinal]. Thus, our example can only refer to a set of presupposed men. 
Therefore, the eight interpretations above probably reduce to four major ones, which 
correspond to the values of a as specific, non-specific but cardinal, specific but non-
cardinal and type. Independently of how many of the above meanings is ever considered 
plausible by any speaker of English, there are clearly more theoretical possibilities than 
the two that scope positions allow for. 
In principle, it would seem natural, given my analysis based on the possible 
features of the quantifiers involved in a construction, that a change in order between the 
two quantifiers should not alter the possibilities of interpretation of the sentence. That is, 
if every has two possible meanings and a has four possible meanings, whether every 
precedes a or a precedes every in the sentence, there should be eight possible 
interpretations. This is because scope, a structural notion, plays no role under my 
account. However, the sentence a woman loves every man does not seem to have as many 
possible interpretations as every man loves a woman. 7 This is precisely expected under 
my analysis, since it is a consequence of the fact that meaning is based on features. The 
commutation of the position of strong and weak quantifiers does result in a reduction of 
the possible meanings of the sentence because the subject position, having the feature 
7 I thank Terry Langendoen for pointing this out to me. 
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[-cardinal] (i.e., +presuppositional) is incompatible with those possible meanings of a 
with the feature [+cardinal]. In other words, the subject position is the projection of a 
functional category with features of its own, which must be checked by a QP in the 
sentence. A weak quantifier in this position can only be interpreted as presuppositional. 
The ambiguity of weak quantifiers (presuppositional or non-presuppositional readings) 
only applies to certain positions. If a weak quantifier is in a functional projection in the 
inflectional component of the sentence, it must be compatible with the features of that 
projection. 
4. Covert Wh-movement. I have argued against the rule of Quantifier Raising at LF to 
explain ambiguities in sentences with quantifiers. I have offered an alternative 
explanation of the ambiguities based on the features of quantifiers, which are functional 
categories and hence need checking. In my account, all the features of a quantifier are 
checked overtly at the point of Merging with its complement, and at the end of the 
computation the interaction of the features of the position where the QP ends and the 
features of the quantifier itself will determine a unique meaning for the sentence. The 
sign of every feature of a functional category (including quantifiers) must be determined 
for every numeration and nothing can be changed or added after the computation has 
started. 
Another type of LF movement proposed in the literature has to do with Wh-
words. Some languages leave their Wh-words in situ (Chinese, Japanese), whereas others 
require overt movement of their Wh-words (English). In order to interpret the sentence as 
a question, it was posited that in the former, the Wh-word undergoes movement at LF 
(Huang, 1982). This is because the Wh-word always has scope over the entire sentence. I 
have already argued against the notion of scope. If one of the major reasons to posit 
covert Wh-movement in a language is to make sure that the Wh-word is placed in a scope 
position so that the sentence is interpreted as an interrogative and we assure wide scope 
of the Wh-word over all other quantifiers in the sentence, then, under my account, covert 
Wh-movement simply does not take place, because scope is not where the meaning 
derives from (see Troike 1990, 1992, for a detailed account of Chinese, Japanese and 
Korean interrogatives in which he argues against Wh-movement). The meaning of a 
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sentence is detennined uniquely by the point of Spell-Out because all the semantic 
features should have been checked by then. 
But then, how do the interrogative sentences in languages with Wh-in situ get 
interpreted as interrogatives? Cheng (1991) notes that the languages that have Wh-words 
in situ are precisely the ones that have question particles. She proposes that all sentences 
must be typed (as interrogatives, declaratives, etc.) and that languages have two choices 
to do this: a fronted Wh-word or a question particle. Thus, one of the motivations for 
positing covert Wh-movement (marking the sentence as a question) disappears if we can 
substitute it by this other way of clause-typing. 
How does my theory apply to languages with Wh-in situ? I will not offer a 
thorough account of Wh-phenomena here, and I will limit myself to a few observations 
and a sketch of my theory applied to Wh-movement. In this type of languages, Wh-words 
can be interpreted as indefinites, interrogative words, universal and existential quantifiers 
(Cheng 1991, Troike and Park 1992, and Jelinek 1998 for a type oflanguage whose Wh-
words share these characteristics with the in-situ languages, Straits Salish). The same 
word means who or someone, what or something in these languages. This establishes a 
clear difference between the features of English Wh-words and those of Wh-words in in 
situ languages, which should be enough to make us undertake the analysis of the 
differences in questions in both types of languages based on the features of these words 
and not on scope considerations. Troike (1990) and Troike and Park (1992) point out that 
the Wh-words in the in situ languages can be [+I-specific]. According to them, when the 
Whlindefinite word is [+specific], it can be bound by a Q[ uestion] operator that has scope 
over the clause. Otherwise, the Wh-word has an indefinite reading. Therefore, covert Wh-
movement is unnecessary to account for the interrogative meaning of these sentences. 
My account is similar: I propose that semantic infonnation is embedded in the 
fonn of features of functional categories. Question particles are functional categories. 
Therefore, those sentences with question particles simply start with a numeration 
containing a functional category that says [+interrogative]. This feature is, of course, 
overtly realized as a morpheme, which is the question particle itself. If the Wh-word is 
[+specific], the interaction between this feature (which gets checked when the item is 
Selected from the numeration to fonn a QP) and that of the question particle creates a 
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unique meaning for the sentence (interrogative). No movement of the QP is necessary, 
unless it is to check other features of the sentence overtly. Cheng points out that the 
interpretation of a Wh-word in Mandarin Chinese depends on other elements in the 
sentence (an interrogative particle of the Wh- or the yes-no type, a negative marker or a 
universal marker). This is consistent with the proposal put forth in this paper that it is the 
interaction of all the features of the functional elements of the sentence that creates 
different readings. Sometimes, these different readings are accompanied with differences 
in surface forms, and others they do converge in the same sentence form, which is why 
we talk about ambiguities of surface strings. 
5. Ambiguity and economy. As stated in section 3, ambiguities are ambiguities only 
from the point of view of the hearer. There are no ambiguous derivations. As I have 
argued in these pages, if a string of words has several meanings, it is because there are 
different derivations involved (starting with different numerations). The traditional LF 
approach also assumes that there are different derivations, but they involve covert 
movement of phrases because the two meanings are based on c-command positions. This 
differs from my theory in that I claim that there are different overt derivations: the 
evaluation procedure that inspects the well-formedness of a QP means that strong 
features of Q are checked overtly by their complement when Merge takes place. Since the 
QP is formed only once, it must have a set of features in order for the derivation to 
proceed and nothing can be added or changed later on in the process, all features of Q 
must be checked at the same time. This is the checking "for free" that Chomsky assumes 
when there is a set of features, some of which are strong and some of which are weak. 
To summarize, the non-idiosyncratic features of functional categories and lexical items 
are determined for each numeration, and the derivation cannot add anything once it has 
started. Even if some aspects of the derivation are unclear to the hearer, the derivation is 
unambiguously created. When Merging elements with each other, those semantic features 
that do not correspond to any overt morpheme will always remain ambiguous to a hearer 
decoding the sentence. 
Ideally, all words should be unambiguous and all features weak, so that there 
would be only one possible meaning per sentence and no movement operations. But that 
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would mean that the inventory of, say, Determiners, would have to increase (every one of 
them would have only a set of possible features). Instead, languages allow for the 
possibility of having [+/-] features in their words and functional categories, so that the 
same category can enter in a number of different constructions. The cost of this is 
ambiguity for the hearer. In other words, economy is a compromise between what 
economy means for the speaker and what it means for the hearer. But a formal model of 
language is not concerned with decoding problems. Having more weak features and 
features with a dual sign has two positive consequences: the derivation performs fewer 
overt operations (i.e., less movement) and at the same time, speakers do not need to store 
thousands of words for different connotations. The hearer, on the other hand, does not 
know exactly how to decode the sentence and sometimes ambiguity results. Hopefully, 
context or frequency helps him select a preferred derivation, which in most cases is the 
intended one. 
The type of quantifier ambiguity discussed in this paper is a very elegant solution 
of language to the problem of expressing all kinds of meanings with few elements. 
Quantifiers are functional categories, that is, a closed-class kind of word. It is not 
inefficient to have so many interpretations for the same string of words. In fact, it is 
economical. To understand this concept of ambiguity as economy, we may look at other 
languages in which the translation of every man loves a woman is not ambiguous. In 
these languages, the prediction is that there are more lexical entries of quantifiers than in 
English, each of which expresses one of the meanings of the English quantifiers. One 
such language is Spanish. In Spanish, the word every translates as three different 
quantifiers: todo, cada and todos. The first two are singular and the third is plural. The 
two singular quantifiers are used in unambiguous ([+distributive]) sentences. (23)a and b 
can only mean that each man loves a different woman. The singular in Spanish is 
incompatible with the type reading of the QP allowed in English. In the case of (23)b, the 
sentence is further restricted to a set of men in particular (that must be established 
previously), and it cannot make reference to men as a class. 
(23) a. Todo hombre ama a una mujer (Every man loves a (different) woman) 
b. Cada hombre ama a una mujer (Each man loves a (different) woman) 
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c. Todos los hombres aman a una mujer (All the men love a woman8J all men love 
a woman--ambiguous) 
(23)c could mean that all men love only one woman in particular or a different one each. 
This is because una (equivalent to English a) is indeed ambiguous between an cardinal 
and an unspecified readings. The plurality of the subject allows for both possibilities, 
whereas the singularity of todo and cada block the cardinal meaning of una (i.e., the 
same woman for every man). These two quantifiers are unambiguously [+distributive]. 
Thus, Spanish is a case in which sentences are less ambiguous, but two quantifiers 
are needed for what English can express with one (todo and todos are directly equivalent 
to every. Cada is equivalent to each). Furthermore, every can collapse the three meanings 
(todo, todos and cada), but todo cannot mean plurality at all, as every does in English. 
Todo cannot have the feature [-distributive]. It unambiguously has the fixed value 
[+distributive] for every derivation it enters in. Less ambiguity equates less economy of 
functional categories and less versatility of their features. 
There have been a few senses in which the word economy has been used in the 
generative literature. In the era prior to 1980, a grammar was an evaluation procedure: 
the set of rules that most efficiently explained the data was considered the best grammar 
(Chomsky (1995a)). After 1980, the Principles and Parameters approach meant that, 
given the data, there is only one language which is consistent with it. As Chomsky points 
out, the question of explanatory adequacy could be asked in a serious way for the first 
time. The Minimalist Program is yet another step towards understanding the role of 
economy in language. The "least-effort" principles that appear pervasively in the 
literature are promoted to principles of grammar. Language is considered to be the best 
possible solution for the conditions imposed from outside the language faculty (the "bare 
output conditions", Chomsky 1995a, 1995b). Every derivation is the most economical 
possible given the array of words that starts it. The fact that syntactic operations are 
8 Note that the literal translation of the Spanish sentence is ungrammatical in English with the meaning that 
all men love a woman (i.e., the class of men). This is a phrase with two Quantifiers, the and all. In English, 
the features of the must be such that it cannot express generality. In Spanish, however, this does not hold, 
and the interaction between these two quantifiers is grammatical. 
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caused by functional categories and that parametric variation is limited to strength of 
features permits a very narrow class of typological variation among languages. 
My account of quantifier ambiguity unveils another aspect of economy in 
Minimalism: the fact that having [+/-] semantic features in functional categories creates 
ambiguity of surface forms allows the speaker to express a wide range of meanings with 
a very reduced inventory of devices. Furthermore, it indicates that covert movement of 
phrases for scope purposes is unnecessary, and that overt syntax contains all it needs to 
derive the desired semantic results by the point of Spell-Out. This, indeed, means that 
ambiguity in language is a consequence of economy and a necessity if "least-effort" 
principles govern Universal Grammar. 
4. Summary and Conclusions. The preceding pages are part of a logical reasoning to 
eliminate LF as a syntactic level where operations that complete the derivation take place. 
One of the motivations for LF was to explain data concerning the ambiguities of 
sentences with more than one quantifier. In this paper, quantifier ambiguities are 
accounted for without recourse to c-command or scope notions, that is to say, without 
reference to their position. Instead, they are explained in terms of the features that, as 
functional categories, quantifiers have. These features can have a plus or a minus sign, 
and are determined for a particular derivation at the point of the numeration. Ambiguous 
sentences are the result of distinct numerations. There are no ambiguous derivations. 
Every derivation is unique, because it is based on a unique numeration. There are 
ambiguous surface forms, because semantic features that are not attached to a particular 
overt morpheme are "invisible" to the hearer. 
The quantifier strong features are obligatorily checked by their complements at 
the point in which they Merge to create a QP, since the evaluation procedure must make 
sure that the derivation can proceed if and only if the morphological features of D and its 
complement are compatible with each other. All other features of the quantifier are also 
checked at the same time. The QP then acquires the features of both the quantifier and its 
complement, and becomes an argument of the verb. No features can be added to it later, 
which is the reason why the QP must inherit all features of both of its components when 
it is created. The QP will move to check other features of the derivation as needed. At the 
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point of Spell-Out, there is a unique order with a unique set of features: hence, a unique 
meaning. 
Explaining syntactic phenomena in terms of features of functional categories is 
the basic mechanism of Minimalism. My analysis does not propose anything else. The 
same analysis should be applied to the "categorial" and "aspectual" ambiguities 
exemplified at the beginning of this paper. The derivation in (3) is either plus or minus 
[telic], a feature that must be checked by the verb. No change in syntactic category is 
needed. Likewise, the same feature explains the ambiguity in (5). This theory, of course, 
should also be made extensive to other phenomena that have been previously explained 
through covert movement. Merging and checking account for the meaning of sentences. 
The evaluation procedure makes sure that the derivation can proceed after DPs are 
created, which means that all the features of D must be checked by Merging. The 
syntax/semantics interface consists of accepting that functional categories have semantic 
features. This is unquestionable, since we know that functional elements contribute to the 
meaning of sentences. It should be noted that, under my account, the definition of weak 
features is changed: a strong feature is one that requires overt checking by a lexical 
category. A weak feature is one that is checked "for free", when the strong features with 
which it forms a set are checked. Thus, weak features are also checked during the overt 
computation. 
Logical descriptions of sentences are useful in understanding what features we 
must posit in the lexical entries of words. By describing the meanings of sentences 
containing quantifiers, we are able to determine the set of features of those quantifiers. 
But logical descriptions should not be part of the model. Following the steps of the 
reasoning of this paper, we logically do not need them. 
Ambiguities are a consequence of the fact that economy considerations rule 
language. Thus, they are not inelegant. On the contrary, they support Chomsky'S 
hypothesis that language is the best possible solution for the conditions imposed to the 
language faculty. In particular, speakers can express a wide range of meanings with a 
very reduced class of words: functional categories. For instance, a derivation with two 
functional categories (each of which with a [+1-] feature), allows for four possible 
combinations, which is the case in sentences with two quantifiers. Two positive outcomes 
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result: language acquisition is reduced to setting the strength of features and the memory 
load for speakers is kept reasonable. This suggests that some version of Minimalism may 
be a plausible model of language. The fewer operations we posit, the better. If we can 
account for phenomena with the mechanisms of overt syntax, that is all the model needs. 
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